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The past few decades have witnessed a dramatic renewal of interest in the 
natural law tradition within philosophical circles after years of relative neglect.1 
This natural law renaissance, however, has yet to bear much fruit within 
American constitutional discourse, especially among commentators on the left.2 
At the same time, some contemporary progressive constitutional theorists have 
begun to complain about the inadequacy of the conceptual tools at their 
disposal to discuss the interface between their moral and constitutional 
commitments. Robin West, for example, has recently argued that within 
contemporary liberal constitutional scholarship, “[t]here is almost nothing . . . 
about the possible constitutional grounding of the moral duties, whether 
enumerated or unenumerated, of either federal or state legislators to legislate, 
or to do so in particular ways, or toward particular ends.”3 Related to West’s 
observation, there is an increasing tendency within progressive political circles 
to bemoan the absence of a vocabulary with which to articulate the moral 
grounds for the left’s political agenda.4 The natural law tradition would seem 
to provide a great deal of what these commentators find lacking in current 
progressive political and legal discussions: rich concepts and language with 
which to probe the moral character and legitimacy of constitutional law and 
government action (or inaction). The failure of these constitutional theorists to 
 
1.  For some major recent philosophical works exploring the natural law tradition, see JOHN 
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS 
(2001); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 
(1993); ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS’S 
THEORY OF NATURAL LAW: AN ANALYTIC RECONSTRUCTION (1996); and ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988). 
2.  See Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Moral Point of View, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND 
MORALITY 195, 196 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (discussing the limited influence of 
contemporary natural law thinking).  
3.  Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 
4, on file with author). TK Month 
4.  See, e.g., Geoffrey Nunberg, Speech Impediments, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 1, 2004, at 45, 47 
(“Recapturing the language of morality is the most important single step in refashioning a 
new progressive rhetoric, one free of the technocratic jargon for which Democrats have had 
a lamentable penchant in the past.”). This complaint from political observers is connected to 
West’s complaint because, as Robert Post and Reva Siegel have argued, constitutional 
jurisprudence derives strength and coherence from its interaction with popular political 
discourse. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s 
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 571 (2006) (“[C]onstitutional law is made in 
continuous dialogue with political culture.”). Post and Siegel argue that progressive 
constitutional jurisprudence will not be revived until the left learns to reconnect its 
jurisprudential vision with a broader discourse of progressive politics. See id. at 569-75.  
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embrace—or even to really engage with—the natural law tradition, however, 
reflects its marginal and—at least among progressives—deeply suspect status.5  
In light of its low profile within contemporary constitutional debates, an 
effort to formulate a natural law constitutionalism is almost by definition an 
event worthy of sustained attention. In Restoring the Lost Constitution, Randy 
Barnett draws heavily upon a natural law theory of constitutional legitimacy to 
argue in favor of a radically libertarian reading of the Constitution.6 His 
position is creatively and engagingly argued and has the potential to reshape 
the terms of debate on any number of issues. It is therefore unsurprising that 
Barnett’s book has garnered significant attention, both inside the academy and 
beyond. Steven Calabresi has compared its significance to Richard Epstein’s 
landmark work, Takings.7 And since its publication, Restoring the Lost 
Constitution has been the subject of a seemingly endless stream of blog 
discussions.8 Barnett’s important book, and the substantial commentary it has 
generated, may well help to foster interest in natural law constitutionalism. 
At least part of the progressive aversion to natural law theory, however, is 
likely rooted in a persistent hunch that there is something inherently 
conservative about natural law reasoning. It is hard to blame recent observers 
for forming that opinion. The most prominent of the “new” natural law 
theorists, after all, have expended enormous energy advocating expansive legal 
codification of a decidedly “old” sexual morality.9 Princeton’s Robert George, 
for example, has enthusiastically defended—on natural law grounds—laws 
criminalizing private, consensual homosexual conduct.10 And John Finnis has 
deployed natural law arguments in defense of laws prohibiting the distribution 
 
5.  See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 196 (calling natural law “marginalized”). 
6.  RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
82-83 (2004). 
7.  See Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply 
to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081-82 (2005). 
8.  See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Reply to Barnett, ProfessorBainbridge.com, May 7, 2004, 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2004/05/reply_to_barnet.html; The Road to Hell Is 
Paved with Good Intentions, The Smallest Minority, Mar. 28, 2004, 
http://smallestminority.blogspot.com/2004/03/road-to-hell-is-paved-with-good.html; Tung 
Yin, Randy Barnett’s Restoring the Lost Constitution, The Yin Blog, Mar. 29, 2004, 
http://yin.typepad.com/the_yin_blog/2004/03/randy_barnetts_.html. 
9.  See Stephen Macedo, Against the Old Sexual Morality of the New Natural Law, in NATURAL 
LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY, supra note 2, at 27, 27. 
10.  See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family in Support 
of the Respondent at 17-24, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Robert P. 
George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 320 
(1995). 
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of contraception to unmarried couples.11 There is no essential connection, 
however, between natural law reasoning and the specific agenda advocated by 
George and Finnis. 
But while Barnett vigorously argues against the sort of morals legislation 
that George and Finnis have been eager to defend, his libertarian emphasis on 
unfettered rights of property and contract is likely to reinforce the notion that 
natural law theorizing is an activity best left to those on the rightmost end of 
the political spectrum. It would be a mistake, however, to understand Barnett’s 
libertarian version of natural law constitutional theory as exhausting—any 
more than George and Finnis’s version—the possibilities of the tradition. As I 
argue in Part I, although Barnett’s theory of constitutional legitimacy is infused 
with language drawn from the broader natural law framework, his “natural 
rights” theory, as he calls it, actually departs in significant ways from the 
classical natural law tradition. Moreover, there are substantial reasons to favor 
a version of natural law with implications for state power that are far more 
progressive. Nor does Barnett establish, as I argue in Part II, that the 
Constitution itself somehow locks us into a commitment to his libertarian, 
natural rights version of natural law theory. 
Indeed, without changing much in Barnett’s account, it is possible to 
convert his theory from one that supports the conservative goal of limiting the 
power of government, restricting it to the narrow task of facilitating or 
preserving property and contract rights, into one that justifies a far more 
capacious and progressive view. If constitutional legitimacy comes from 
conformity with justice, as Barnett correctly argues, and if justice entails not 
only negative constraints protecting the individual from certain forms of state 
coercion, but also obligations to the community as well as affirmative 
entitlements held by individuals and groups against the community, then a 
constitution may well be illegitimate if it merely constrains particular state 
actions and does not empower, or at times even require, the state to enforce 
those obligations and satisfy those entitlements. Nor does support for an 
increased state role in the economic sphere commit a progressive natural law 
theorist to endorsing state activism in the area of sexual morality. As I argue in 
Part III and, indeed, throughout this Review, far from being inherently 
conservative (in the contemporary, popular political sense of that term), 
natural law constitutional theory is consistent both with respect for a robust 
sphere of individual autonomy and with active state regulation and 
redistribution of property. 
 
11.  See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 11, 38-39 (1995). 
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i. natural law or natural rights? two traditions 
Throughout his book, Barnett draws heavily on what might, as a generic 
matter, be termed a traditional “natural law” methodology. As a libertarian, 
however, Barnett is eager to distance himself from certain aspects of classical 
natural law jurisprudence, especially its broadly statist tendencies. He therefore 
refers to himself and his Lockean fellow travelers as “natural rights” theorists, 
as distinct from “natural law” theorists—a broader category into which he 
places Thomas Aquinas.12 “Whereas natural law ethics assesses the propriety of 
individual conduct,” Barnett says, “natural rights assesses the propriety or 
justice of restrictions imposed on individual conduct.”13 Although I agree with 
Barnett that there is something fundamentally different about the projects in 
which Locke and Aquinas were engaged, his precise characterization of that 
difference is unsatisfying. 
To begin with, while it is true that Aquinas explored the rightness or 
wrongness of individual actions, he was also, as Barnett recognizes, interested 
in questions concerning the proper relationship between the individual and the 
state and between morality and law; that is, he was interested in the same 
questions of political and legal theory that concern Barnett.14 Of course, 
Aquinas’s answers to these questions differ in dramatic ways from those 
offered by Locke (and by Barnett). For example, Locke viewed private 
ownership as a natural institution preexisting the state, and he regarded the 
state’s principal function as safeguarding those private ownership rights.15 In 
contrast, Aquinas understood property as socially constructed and subject to a 
great deal of communal control and redistribution.16 
As Barnett acknowledges, to the extent that Locke and other natural rights 
theorists have sought to derive their political theory from their own 
observations about human nature, they share certain basic methodological 
commitments with those whom Barnett calls “natural law” theorists.17 Aquinas 
and Locke (and Barnett) part company, however, when they begin to discuss 
 
12.  BARNETT, supra note 6, at 82-83. 
13.  Id. at 83. 
14.  See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 13-14 
(1998); see also 1-2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 96, art. 2 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., 1947) (c. 1267-1273). 
15.  See JOHN LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government (1690), in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 1, 155 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003). 
16.  See 2-2 AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 66, arts. 2, 7; see also JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, 
POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 188-96 (1998). 
17.  See BARNETT, supra note 14, at 13-14. 
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the actual contours of a normative theory of human nature. Barnett takes issue 
with the frequent characterization of classical liberal political theory as 
embracing an “atomistic” conception of the person.18 He correctly observes that 
theories of natural rights make no sense outside the context of community 
because an individual living apart from all others would have no need for the 
protection of individual rights. “[N]atural rights,” he explains, “are those 
rights that are needed precisely to protect individuals and associations from the 
power of others—including the power of the stronger, of groups, and of the 
State—when and only when persons are deeply enmeshed in a social 
context.”19 
This is surely true. An individual living in total isolation need not worry 
about intrusions on his “liberty,” as Barnett understands that term. But 
Barnett’s observation also fails to identify accurately the basis for the critique of 
classical liberalism at which he is taking aim.20 The communitarian critics to 
whom Barnett apparently refers do not allege that classical liberals believe that 
people actually do (or even want to) live as isolated individuals. Instead, they 
take issue with classical liberal theorists’ derivation of the rules of political 
community from a hypothetical state of nature made up of fully formed, 
freestanding individuals.21 
The classical liberal contractarian argument typically looks something like 
the following: it begins with the mature individual in a state of nature 
characterized by maximal (negative) liberty and by the utter absence of 
involuntary communal commitments or obligations. From this starting point, 
classical liberal theorists typically seek to derive rules for society that preserve 
as much of this hypothetical state of nature as possible, at least with respect to 
the individual’s experience of liberty, while gaining for everyone the benefits of 
 
18.  See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 83-84. 
19.  Id. at 84. 
20.  Whether this critique is apt when directed against contemporary liberal theory is a separate 
question and, given Barnett’s self-identification with classical liberal legal theory, is not 
relevant to my discussion. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Liberalism and Communitarianism, in 11 
THE PHILOSOPHER’S ANNUAL 87, 87-88 (Patrick Grim et al. eds., 1988) (defending “modern 
liberalism” against communitarian arguments but distinguishing “classical liberalism” from 
the version he defends). 
21.  See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 276-77 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005) (1960); 
Charles Taylor, Atomism, in POWERS, POSSESSIONS AND FREEDOM 39, 48-49 (Alkis Kontos 
ed., 1979). Critics have made a similar argument against John Rawls’s contractarian 
arguments. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 62-64 (2d 
ed. 1998); Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS 1, 9-10 (Norman Daniels ed., 
1989). 
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community life. They demand that the move from this hypothetical (and 
idealized) situation of isolation and freedom to one of social obligation either 
be the result of voluntary choice or, when the constraint is involuntarily 
imposed, be justified by the need to preserve (or enhance) every individual’s 
enjoyment of the liberty present within the original state of nature.22 
Barnett’s underlying political theory perfectly illustrates this move. On the 
one hand, he praises voluntary associations and welcomes the substantial 
restrictions they often impose on individual liberty, but he does so only to the 
extent that they are voluntarily joined. “[U]nder conditions of unanimous 
consent,” he argues, “liberty is not inconsistent with both heavy regulation and even 
the prohibition of otherwise rightful conduct.”23 Accordingly, like many property 
libertarians, he celebrates the restraints on individual freedom assumed by 
those who join private residential communities.24 On the other hand, he is 
extremely suspicious of the state precisely because he views it as an unchosen 
community from which exit is extremely costly:  
The larger the land area, the higher the cost of exit and thus the less 
meaningful is ‘tacit’ consent to the jurisdiction of the lawmaking 
process. Most modern cities are probably too large, but even if they are 
small enough, states are certainly too large to command meaningful 
unanimous consent.25  
 Consequently, he favors dramatically limiting the power of virtually all 
territorially defined governments to intrude upon individual liberty. Drawing 
heavily on Lockean political theory, Barnett argues that the principal purpose 
of government must be limited to the protection of a constellation of negative 
individual liberties, such as private property and freedom of contract, the 
 
22.  See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 154-57 (describing the transition from the state of nature to 
society as a voluntary choice driven by a desire to put the protection of one’s liberty and 
property on a more secure footing); Richard A. Epstein, One Step Beyond Nozick’s Minimal 
State: The Role of Forced Exchanges in Political Theory, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 286, 289-96 
(2005).  
23.  BARNETT, supra note 6, at 43. 
24.  At the same time, Barnett demonstrates an ambivalence about even such voluntarily joined 
communities by emphasizing the importance of the “low cost of exit” from these 
communities, a feature that is necessary, he says, to “make[] this initial consent 
meaningful.” Id. at 41. He quotes with approval Frank Knight’s statement that “effective 
freedom depends upon an alternative open to the non-conforming individual of leaving the 
group without suffering loss or damage.” Id.  
25.  Id. at 43. 
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operation of which helps to preserve the individual liberty present in the 
prepolitical state of nature.26 
From where does Barnett derive the content of these negative liberties? 
From an implicit normative account of the human person as an uncoerced 
individual living free from the constraints of involuntary community life. It is 
for this reason that Barnett (like other classical liberals) talks about the 
appropriate terms on which individuals hypothetically “enter” society with 
each other.27 One can only enter society, after all, if one was not already there 
to begin with. And, as Charles Taylor has observed, classical liberals 
understand this being who enters into society and trades away her preexisting 
liberty to be a fully formed, rational, and autonomous individual.28 
This normative reliance on the (hypothetically) isolated, autonomous 
individual is all that most theorists mean when they accuse Lockean liberals of 
constructing their political philosophy upon an atomized conception of human 
nature. They are not charging that Lockean liberals actually think that people 
prefer to live an antisocial existence or that liberals believe that the state of 
nature, as Locke described it, actually existed. Instead, they are charging, 
accurately, that classical liberals attribute overriding significance to a 
hypothetical individual in isolation, a hypothetical that communitarians find to 
be normatively sterile.29 We are a deeply social species, the communitarian 
argues, and essentially so.30 Indeed, as Taylor and others have argued, we 
cannot even become the mature human beings capable of rational reflection 
and free decision (i.e., the sorts of beings presupposed by liberal contractarian 
political theory) without substantial, and for the most part involuntary, social 
interaction and preparation.31 
In other words, the most significant distinction between what Barnett calls 
“natural law” and “natural rights” approaches to deciphering the proper 
relationship between the individual and the state is not a difference of subject 
matter but a radical divergence of normative conceptions of the person. As 
John Courtney Murray put it:  
The premise of Locke’s state of nature is a denial that sociability is 
inherent in the very nature of man, and the assertion that the civil state 
 
26.  See id. at 75. 
27.  See id. at 68-76. 
28.  See Taylor, supra note 21, at 49. 
29.  See 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 189-90 (1985). 
30.  See MURRAY, supra note 21, at 274, 296. 
31.  See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE 
VIRTUES 107-09 (2001); Taylor, supra note 21, at 54-57. 
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is adventitious, that man is by nature only a solitary atom, who does 
not seek in society the necessary condition of his natural perfectibility as 
man, but only a utilitarian convenience for the fuller protection of his 
individual self in its individuality.32 
For communitarians, by contrast, the normative person is the contextualized 
individual already embedded in and shaped by the community.33 In light of his 
fundamentally different starting point, Aquinas, along with many others 
whom Barnett would classify as “natural law” theorists, was not committed to 
viewing the state’s principal function as actively preserving an impermeable 
membrane of negative liberty that protects the individual from nonconsensual 
social obligations. 
Contrast the standard Lockean depiction of the state of nature as consisting 
of isolated individuals with the story Aquinas told about the status of private 
property rights. Rather than beginning with individuals in isolation who then 
bargain their way into political community to protect preexisting property 
rights, Aquinas began from the point of view of a political community already 
in existence. He proceeded to argue that, given the somewhat selfish tendencies 
of human beings, communal recognition of limited individual rights of private 
ownership was (practically) necessary to encourage industriousness and to 
avoid conflict and confusion over who in the community was responsible for 
what.34 On one of the few occasions when Aquinas spoke in terms that we 
might understand as referring to subjective natural rights, he did so not in 
favor of a property owner’s right to be free from communal interference but in 
favor of the affirmative entitlement held by a needy individual to share in the 
consumption of the community’s material wealth, even when the exercise of 
that entitlement involved appropriating the private property of another.35 
To summarize, the difference between what Barnett calls “natural law” and 
“natural rights” theories is not the subject matter in which they are interested, 
as Barnett insists, but rather their substantive conception of the normative 
human person. Natural rights theorists, including Locke, build their political 
theories on the dubious foundation of a hypothetical, prepolitical individual 
bargaining his way into organized political community and holding out for the 
best possible deal. Classical natural law theorists begin from a far more realistic 
conception of human beings as we have always known them, as animals 
already living in society and struggling collectively to find sustainable and just 
 
32.  MURRAY, supra note 21, at 276. 
33.  See Taylor, supra note 21, at 60. 
34.  See 2a-2ae AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 66, art. 2. 
35.  See id. art. 7. 
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mechanisms for balancing the legitimate demands of the community with the 
interests and dignity of the individual. 
The arguments Barnett provides in this book on behalf of the libertarian 
conception of the person, and the basket of negative liberty rights it yields, are 
both underdeveloped and unpersuasive. “People living in every society,” 
Barnett argues, “confront certain pervasive obstacles to the pursuit of 
happiness.”36 Echoing Locke’s arguments about the origins of government, 
Barnett identifies the purpose of the political community as rooted in the 
human need to overcome what he calls problems of “knowledge, interest, and 
power.”37 As within Locke’s political philosophy, people come together to form 
a government in order to enhance their ability to protect their preexisting 
individual rights without at the same time violating the rights of others. That 
is, government is created to permit people to spend less time defending their 
own rights against the depredations of others and to avoid the dangers that 
arise when people attempt to serve as judge, jury, and executioner in cases that 
concern their own interests.38 
Even the most cursory consideration of the human condition, however, 
reveals the incompleteness of this account. All three of these “problems,” as 
Barnett understands them, are challenges faced when individuals attempt to 
protect preexisting interests against other individuals or communities. On the 
one hand, it is true that this focus is not “antisocial” because these problems 
only arise when individuals are actually interacting. On the other hand, 
although Barnett intends his theory to be broadly descriptive of pervasive 
human experiences, he selectively emphasizes goods and problems associated 
with the avoidance of unchosen social interaction and with individual 
protection against others—a focus that gives rise to rights understood in the 
negative sense as shields. Accordingly, he neglects goods associated with 
preparation for, or facilitation and empowerment of, social interaction—a focus 
more comfortable with a conception of rights broad enough to encompass both 
defense and obligation. 
This is not to deny that the problems Barnett identifies are real conflicts 
that may well be universal across human communities. But in focusing on 
these problems of knowledge, interest, and power, Barnett loses sight of what 
we might call problems of survival, preparation, and participation. A shift 
toward these neglected problems would push in favor of abandoning Barnett’s 
narrowly negative conception of rights for a more capacious view. 
 
36.  BARNETT, supra note 6, at 80. 
37.  Id. 
38.  See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 155. 
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For most theorists, it is uncontroversial to posit that human beings are 
entitled to access to the resources necessary for physical survival. As even some 
of the most libertarian of property scholars have acknowledged, the extreme 
needs of some in the community ought to trump the rights that others hold 
over their surplus resources.39 Locke himself defended the idea.40 
Acknowledging a right to survival resources in effect recognizes the existence of 
an entitlement to the (even involuntary) assistance of others under certain 
circumstances and, on most accounts, to the assistance of the state in obtaining 
survival resources or in fending off attempts by private owners to prevent those 
in need from taking them. The very structure of this entitlement, and the 
forced sharing it justifies, fits only uncomfortably, if at all, within Barnett’s 
discussion of natural rights, in which individual property and contract rights 
precede (and limit) the formation of community and pursuit of the common 
good.41 An alternative conception views human beings as essentially embedded 
in community and understands property rights as the cooperative creations of 
the society in the service of human flourishing. On this view, in which the 
well-being of the individual and the health of the society (and other individual 
members of that society) are indissolubly intertwined, the qualification of 
individual property rights in order to protect the lives of individual community 
members makes perfect sense.42 
In addition to survival, the long period of intellectual and moral training 
necessary for full human development means that all human societies confront 
the problem of how to ensure the provision and just distribution of scarce 
 
39.  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM 98-100 (2003).  
40.  See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 29-30, 56, 111, 182-83. 
41.  Locke’s affirmation of the doctrine of necessity does not demonstrate the compatibility of 
that doctrine with libertarian principles as much as it points to the ways in which Locke was 
not a pure libertarian. Locke’s embrace of the necessity doctrine derives from his initial 
assertion that “God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common.” Id. at 111. This 
communal starting point, itself a remnant of the classical natural law tradition, see 2a-2ae 
AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 66, art. 2, serves as a moderating force within Lockean property 
theory—one that does not survive among contemporary libertarians, who tend to reject both 
the notion of forced sharing and Locke’s starting point of communal ownership, see, e.g., 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174, 238 (1974) (“Even to exercise his right to 
determine how something he owns is to be used may require other means he must acquire a 
right to, for example, food to keep him alive; he must put together, with the cooperation of 
others, a feasible package.”); AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW CONCEPT OF 
EGOISM 54-56 (1964) (arguing that sharing with those in dire need, even in an emergency, is 
“an act of generosity, not of moral duty”). This makes some sense because the necessity 
doctrine’s prescription of involuntary communal obligation clashes with libertarian 
insistence that communal obligation be voluntary. 
42.  See 2a-2ae AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 66, art. 7; FINNIS, supra note 1, at 191-92. 
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resources for training the young, who are in no position to provide for 
themselves.43 Again, the pursuit of a social conception of human flourishing 
points in the direction of some minimal provision for the well-being and 
education of the young, irrespective of the wisdom, diligence, or luck of their 
parents. Almost by definition, such an entitlement will demand a degree of 
economic redistribution and regulation, either in cash or in kind. Those whose 
parents cannot afford education must have that education provided to them at 
the expense of others. Moreover, this redistributive educational process 
arguably points in the direction of ensuring that the parents of such children 
have the economic resources necessary to provide a suitable home environment 
in which the educational effort can take root.44 Plausible natural law arguments 
can therefore support not just a basic entitlement to education but also such 
welfare-state measures as minimum wages, subsidized housing, and social 
insurance45—the kinds of redistributive and regulatory economic measures that 
Barnett would very much like to rule out. 
Finally, resources are necessary to facilitate the sorts of social interactions 
essential for a well-lived human life.46 These resources take the form of both 
material goods that individuals need to function socially and an underlying 
social context in which individuals and groups may interact. With respect to 
the former, Adam Smith, Amartya Sen, and others have argued that the precise 
content and quantity of the resources necessary for a viable social life will vary 
between different societies and within the same society over time.47 
Nevertheless, because human beings experience sociability as an imperative 
and not as a choice, all societies must struggle with the challenge of providing 
adequate opportunities for individuals to obtain the things they need to 
function as social beings without at the same time undermining the necessary 
incentives for productive activity. In the context of a modern capitalist society 
 
43.  See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 31, at 107-09. 
44.  Recent studies, for example, affirm the importance of families’ financial resources to 
children’s educational outcomes. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING 
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT 
GAP 37-50 (2004) (describing the ways in which family poverty directly hinders the 
effectiveness of children’s education); Doris R. Entwisle et al., First Grade and Educational 
Attainment by Age 22, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1458, 1481 (2005) (finding that family socioeconomic 
status has an enormous impact on children’s ultimate educational attainment). 
45.  See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 44, at 129-47. 
46.  See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming May 2007). 
47.  See JOHN A. RYAN, A LIVING WAGE: ITS ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 126-27 (1912); 
AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES AND DEVELOPMENT 325-43 (1984); 2 ADAM SMITH, THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 413-506 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1869) (1776). 
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like our own, sociability entails meaningful participation in the market, and 
this observation in turn suggests a human right to a social safety net that 
guarantees a substantial basket of resources. This is not to say that an 
entitlement to receive those resources cannot be conditioned on, for example, a 
willingness to work if able to do so. But however the details are conceived, 
attention to human beings’ social needs pushes strongly toward an entitlement 
to substantial and realistic opportunities to obtain the goods required for some 
minimally acceptable level of participation in the social life of the community.  
An adequate account of the opportunities necessary for the social 
participation essential to human flourishing will also consider the background 
conditions within which individuals come together to interact. Human beings 
live a richer and freer life in a pluralistic social order in which neither the state 
nor large private actors can arrogate enough power to monopolize 
opportunities for social and economic expression. A progressive natural law 
therefore favors a vibrant, organic social and economic life that transpires on a 
human scale populated by diverse intermediary communities such as families, 
unions, small enterprises, neighborhoods, churches, and many others. It will 
also support efforts to responsibly steward the environment for future 
generations who are not represented in the political process and whose 
interests tend to be discounted by present economic decision-makers.48 The 
maintenance of such a rich and humane social and environmental context 
requires state action to counterbalance (and redistribute) large concentrations 
of private economic power as well as constant vigilance against the possibility 
that the state will either overreach or become a tool of powerful private 
interests. 
The problem these other interests pose for Barnett’s theory of rights is that 
their interaction is anything but tidy. Human beings’ material needs, for 
example, combine with the vicissitudes of luck and intergenerational effects to 
undermine the case for the inflexible and transgenerational protection of 
property entitlements that Barnett advocates. If we accept the proposition that 
property rights, at least in surplus resources, must give way to the more 
pressing needs of nonowners, it follows that a government that takes the side 
of property owners who attempt to block such transfers in order to protect 
preexisting property entitlements would be acting unjustly. Indeed, given the 
scale of modern society and the concomitant opportunities it provides for 
owners to shirk their duties to share, government is certainly justified, and 
perhaps—given the predictability of that shirking—affirmatively obligated, to 
 
48.  See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting, on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) 
(manuscript at 1-2, on file with author) (discussing the tendency of cost-benefit analysis to 
undervalue the interests of future generations). TK Month 
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compel the wealthy to share their surplus with the poor.49 The natural law 
arguments on behalf of such involuntary redistribution are especially 
compelling when applied to the resource needs of the young, whose poverty 
cannot be attributed to poor choices of their own. But they also point toward 
the importance of protecting the poorest—young and old—against the effects 
of sheer bad luck. And the failure of any capitalist economy to provide 
employment opportunities at a living wage for all who are willing to work or to 
provide fully for the needs of the poor through voluntary philanthropy means 
that the implications of the analysis likely extend even further. 
Support for state intervention in the economy, however, does not require a 
progressive theory of natural law to endorse the sorts of intrusions on private 
sexual conduct advocated by Finnis, George, and other conservative natural 
lawyers. As Barnett helpfully highlights, even the classical natural law 
tradition, despite its perfectionist ambitions, provides ample tools to resist the 
state’s insertion into every corner of life, including private consensual sexual 
relationships. Barnett quotes, for example, Aquinas’s famous argument about 
the folly of trying to legally enforce all moral norms.50 According to Aquinas: 
[H]uman law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of 
whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid 
all vices, from which the virtuous abstain but only the more grievous 
vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly 
those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human 
society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft 
and suchlike.51 
As Aquinas pointed out, attempts to embody all of morality in law are doomed 
to failure and are likely to be counterproductive, inducing in citizens a 
contempt for law and perhaps even an embrace of a sort of moral and legal 
nihilism.52 The tools of legal prohibition should therefore be reserved for the 
kinds of harmful conduct that are likely to substantially disrupt the social 
order.  
 
49.  See JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS, 1981-1991, at 240-44 (1993); cf. 
Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property 19 (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 
06-30, 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=926082 (discussing the collective 
action problems that push philanthropic impulses toward arguments for forced 
redistribution). 
50.  BARNETT, supra note 6, at 83.  
51.  1a-2ae AQUINAS, supra note 14, q. 96, art. 2 (emphasis added). 
52.  See id. 
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As a general matter, these considerations apply with equal force to state 
efforts to enforce the (moral) demands of distributive justice. How far the state 
should go in attempting to enforce moral obligations to shift material resources 
toward the poor will be a complicated prudential calculation, deeply informed 
by empirical considerations.53 Given this uncertainty and contingency, it is 
easier to draw negative than affirmative conclusions. For example, it is easier to 
rule out Barnett’s rigidly libertarian constitution, which would categorically 
prohibit the state from interfering with the operation of the market, 
irrespective of empirical observations about the likely consequences of such 
intervention for the poor, than it is to spell out in precise detail the exact 
contours of economic entitlements or the most just system of taxation with 
which to fund them. Nevertheless, the correct questions are prudential, not 
questions about the rights of property owners against redistribution of their 
surplus property. A progressive natural lawyer, moreover, would argue that the 
state is justified in treating the enforcement of economic justice differently than 
questions of sexual morality (however defined) because of the relative difficulty 
of detecting and deterring violations of sexual norms, the harm to privacy of 
even attempting to do so, and the fundamental importance of distributive 
justice to the maintenance over the long run of a viable social order. 
In the middle of the last century, for example, Murray built upon Aquinas’s 
pragmatic discussion to argue against the legal prohibition of private sexual 
acts, such as the use of contraception.54 Writing in terms that even a libertarian 
like Barnett might well endorse, Murray argued that respect for the important 
role of freedom within an adequate account of human flourishing meant that 
the law should be guided by the principle, “[a]s much freedom as possible; as 
much restriction and coercion as necessary.”55 Murray went on to note that, “in 
 
53.  See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL 
LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY ¶ 20 (1986). The complex 
empirical inquiries relevant to the formulation of redistributive policy include, among many 
others, what resources the poor need at particular times and places to flourish, the best form 
in which to deliver those resources (e.g., in cash or in kind, as a grant or in exchange for 
required work), the effects of different degrees of economic inequality on the well-being of 
the poor and on society as a whole, and the consequences of redistributive policy for 
society’s overall productivity and for the poor themselves. 
54.  See John Courtney Murray, Memo to Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation, 
http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/library/Murray/1965F.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2006). 
Finnis has indicated that he accepts reasoning along Murray’s line of argument, although he 
rejects its extension to the case of public distribution of contraception to unmarried couples. 
See Finnis, supra note 11, at 38-39. Although Murray specifically declined to address the 
broader question about contraception, it is not clear from Murray’s fairly sweeping analysis 
in the Cushing Memo that he would have accepted Finnis’s distinction.  
55.  Murray, supra note 54. 
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the field of sex morality” in particular, “the public educative value of law seems 
almost nil.”56 Finally, he observed that the lack of public consensus on the 
immorality of contraception put it beyond the proper reach of legal 
prohibition.57 Others operating within the natural law tradition have used 
similar logic to defend the result the Court reached in Lawrence v. Texas.58 
Although a full evaluation of the various arguments raised on behalf of these 
positions is well beyond the scope of this Review, at a minimum these 
examples suggest that there is no essential connection between natural law 
theory and a commitment to the state’s involvement in the enforcement of 
sexual morality, or even to a particularly conservative conception of sexual 
morality.59 
Drawing the appropriate limits around permissible state action in the 
private sphere ultimately depends upon the consideration of a complex calculus 
regarding the effectiveness of legal norms in particular contexts as well as the 
development of an adequate account of human flourishing and the role of 
human freedom within that account. Barnett’s narrowly negative conception of 
the state’s proper role results from his failure to consider the dependence of 
human freedom on the social structures necessary to prepare human beings to 
exercise their freedom and on the material resources they need to affirmatively 
put that freedom into practice. Rejecting libertarian limits on state intervention 
in the economic sphere, however, does not require the progressive natural 
lawyer to jettison Barnett’s correct intuition that freedom from excessive 
government intrusion is an important component of human flourishing. 
In drawing attention to the absence from Barnett’s book of an extended 
exploration and defense of the content of his natural rights theory, I do not 
intend to criticize him. After all, Barnett structures his argument precisely to 
avoid having to engage in protracted philosophical debate regarding the 
content of natural law. In the end, however, as I will argue in the next Part, I 
believe that he cannot get around the arduous job of fleshing out the 
 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  538 U.S. 558 (2003); see Gregory A. Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for 
U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 1 (2006). Some prominent theorists have gone even further and have used natural law 
arguments to defend the substantive morality of homosexuality. See infra note 59. 
59.  See, e.g., HURSTHOUSE, supra note 1, at 214-15 (defending the morality of homosexuality on 
natural law grounds); Macedo, supra note 9, at 28 (“[T]he new natural law’s own moral 
stance, properly understood, provides grounds for affirming the good of sexual 
relationships between committed, loving homosexual partners . . . .”); Jean Porter, Human 
Nature and the Purposes of Marriage (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(arguing in natural law terms for the permissibility of gay marriage). 
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philosophical bases for his libertarian political commitments. My only purpose 
in these past few paragraphs has been to suggest that, when he does set out to 
do so, he must confront these alternative conceptions of the natural law 
tradition. 
ii. barnett’s nonoriginalist originalism 
A. Barnett’s Argument 
Barnett attempts to rule out alternative versions of the natural law he 
believes to have been incorporated into the Constitution. As I have already 
indicated, however, he does not do so by setting forth extensive arguments on 
behalf of his particular conception of the content and nature of natural rights. 
Instead, he devotes a great deal of his book to an innovative nonoriginalist 
argument in favor of a rigidly originalist understanding of the Constitution’s 
text. 
As Trevor Morrison has noted, Barnett’s commitment to original meaning 
is itself something of a paradox.60 This is because originalism makes far more 
sense within a consent theory of constitutional legitimacy than within a theory, 
like Barnett’s, that purports to base constitutional legitimacy on natural justice 
alone.61 If a constitution only binds because “We the People” have collectively 
consented to its strictures, a backward-looking orientation that seeks to 
preserve the original terms of that bargain above all else makes a great deal of 
sense. The problem is that Barnett claims to reject these historical, consent-
grounded theories of constitutional legitimacy in favor of a natural law, justice-
based account.62 Barnett’s rejection of consent seems to undermine his case for 
hewing to an originalist interpretive methodology. After all, if, instead of 
trying to figure out the terms of the “deal” to which the People have agreed, we 
concern ourselves with the objective justice of an existing constitutional 
regime, then the deviation of that regime from the original meaning of a 
 
60.  See Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a Libertarian 
Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 849 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, supra note 6). 
61.  See id. at 848-49; see also Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional 
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997) (“The political theory 
underlying strict originalism is a form of social contract theory . . . .”). After noting the 
connection commonly drawn between originalist and contractarian theories of 
constitutional legitimacy, Dorf suggests that this link can be severed and goes on to propose 
a noncontractarian case for the (limited) relevance of original intent. See Dorf, supra, at 
1816-22. 
62.  See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 32-52. 
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historical document is not really very troubling (except to the degree that it 
increases the risk that the constitutional system will transform itself from one 
that is just to one that is unjust at some time in the future—an issue to which I 
will return shortly).  
Despite the strangeness of his combination of a justice-based theory of 
legitimacy with originalism, Barnett’s arguments in favor of a fairly strict 
originalist hermeneutic are the foundation of his entire constructive project. 
Eschewing a direct defense of the cogency of his political theory against 
alternatives, Barnett’s strategy is to avoid getting mired in deep philosophical 
argument by compelling his readers to accept that the Constitution itself 
incorporates the limitations on state action favored by his libertarian reading of 
Lockean political theory and that the Constitution itself rejects the obligations 
imposed by other theories of justice, such as the progressive version of natural 
law theory sketched out above.63 To paraphrase Barnett’s argument, his 
version of natural rights theory might be right or it might be wrong, but that 
theory is embodied in the original meaning of the Constitution. And because 
the original meaning is the only meaning that counts, if you want the 
Constitution to embody some other political theory, you will have to get your 
own constitution or amend the existing one. In other words, Barnett’s 
argument for original-meaning textualism (along with the evidence he 
marshals in support of the original meaning he favors), if successful, allows 
him to enjoy all the fruits of a libertarian constitution while sidestepping the 
far more daunting task of laying out a full-fledged argument for the 
philosophical superiority of his theory.64  
Barnett’s argument for (Lockean) original-meaning textualism proceeds in 
three steps. First, he posits that, as a conceptual matter, the principal purpose 
of a written constitution is to constrain government actors who might 
otherwise be free to act in ways that trample on individual rights: “The 
 
63.  Some scholars have identified less individualistic principles at work in Lockean political 
theory, particularly as it touches on property rights. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND 
WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 204-05 (2003) (describing Lockean 
property theory as consistent with stringent restraints on the intensive use of property); 
GOPAL SREENIVASAN, THE LIMITS OF LOCKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY (1995) (arguing that 
Locke’s theory results in highly limited property rights). Whether these theorists or Barnett 
read Locke more accurately is an interesting question but is beyond the scope of this 
Review. 
64.  Barnett’s negative argument against the viability of consent as a basis for constitutional 
legitimacy does not rest on a fully developed argument for libertarianism but rather on a 
more truncated argument, the goal of which is simply to establish that “first come rights, 
and then comes law.” BARNETT, supra note 6, at 44. As he is careful to point out, “One need 
not accept any particular formulation of background rights . . . to accept the conception of 
constitutional legitimacy advanced here.” Id. 
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Constitution is a law designed to restrict the lawmakers. Although the 
Constitution itself may have multiple purposes and functions, its ‘writtenness’ 
has many fewer. . . . Primarily, constitutions are put in writing to better 
constrain the political actors [they] empower[] to accomplish various ends.”65 
To be clear, Barnett cannot merely be making a historical claim about the 
reasons why the Framers committed our particular Constitution to writing, 
and he cannot be arguing that we are somehow bound by their motives. Given 
his rejection of consent and other historical accounts of constitutional 
legitimacy, those motives are not relevant to his case for originalism. Instead, 
Barnett is making a sweeping conceptual claim that writtenness in 
constitutions serves the purpose of constraining government power. 
He then goes on to claim that the only way for a written constitution to 
achieve, and then “lock in,” this constraint is to limit the text’s meaning to its 
meaning at the time it was put in place: “Adopting any meaning contrary to the 
original meaning would be to contradict or change the meaning of the text and 
thereby to undermine the value of writtenness itself. Writtenness ceases to 
perform its function if meaning can be changed in the absence of an equally 
written modification or amendment.”66 In other words, Barnett believes that a 
commitment to original-meaning textualism follows “inexorably” from the 
mere fact that the Constitution is a written document.67 Barnett goes on to 
argue that it is the constitution thus locked into place by original meaning, and 
only that constitution, that we should evaluate from the point of view of our 
preferred theory of justice. If, based on one’s conception of justice, the 
constitution locked in by this written document is inadequate, then the answer 
is not to reinterpret the text in a manner consistent with that conception but 
rather to amend the text.68 
Finally, Barnett argues, the original meaning of our particular written 
Constitution locks in classical liberal views about the proper limits of 
government power and the sphere of negative liberty protecting the individual 
from communal coercion. Barnett points to provisions like the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, the Ninth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, as well as to a host of contemporaneous 
commentary, in support of this proposition. The combined effect of these 
provisions, he argues, is to limit both state and federal governments to 
 
65.  Id. at 103. 
66.  Id. at 106. 
67.  Id. at 112. 
68.  See id. at 111-12. 
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activities that do not violate the natural rights retained by the people.69 Barnett 
therefore argues for what he calls a “presumption of liberty,” an inversion of 
the prevailing, post-Lochner presumption in favor of the constitutionality of 
most legislative enactments. By a “presumption of liberty,” Barnett means that 
parties burdened by intrusions on (negative) liberty—whether at the hands of 
state or federal government—are presumptively entitled to judicial invalidation 
of those intrusions unless the government can demonstrate that its actions are 
(strictly) necessary to the accomplishment of (a very narrow conception of) 
permissible government ends.70 
Barnett’s strategy, if successful, would allow him to enjoy all the fruits of 
his libertarian version of natural law theory without ever having to offer, in any 
detail, his reasons for favoring it over competing possibilities. As it turns out, 
Barnett’s argument in favor of original-meaning textualism and an exclusively 
Lockean originalist reading of the Constitution is far from watertight. Indeed, 
it raises serious questions at each step. To begin with, there does not seem to 
be an intrinsic connection between writtenness and the goal of constraining 
government intrusion on individual liberty. And even if there were such a 
connection, original-meaning textualism would not be the only means 
available to accomplish that goal. Finally, even if one were to accept original-
meaning textualism, along with Barnett’s understanding of the Constitution’s 
original meaning, there would be ample room for a government that is 
substantially more activist than the one Barnett favors. 
B. Writtenness and Constraint 
Barnett’s argument that the purpose of writtenness in constitutions is to 
constrain lawmakers could be taken to mean either of two things, one of which 
is facially implausible and the other of which appears to beg the question. If we 
understand Barnett to be saying that a constitution’s writtenness necessarily 
serves the purpose of constraining government actors in the sense of limiting 
their discretion, the argument crashes headlong into what my colleague Abner 
Greene has called the “grand, vague clauses of the Constitution.”71 Writings, 
whether contractual or constitutional, can constrain discretion, or they can 
invite it. Our written Constitution, like many others, appears to do both.72  
 
69.  See id. at 54, 189-90, 193-94. 
70.  See id. at 253-69. 
71.  Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1936 (2006). 
72.  Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have 
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and 
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”), 
PENALVER_12-08-06_POST-OP 12/8/2006  7:12:18 PM 
restoring the right constitution? 
121 
 
Barnett cannot simply write off the Constitution’s many opaque provisions 
as atypical or peripheral to his libertarian project. After all, the Constitution is 
at its vaguest when it sets forth the terms on which government may deprive 
citizens of life, liberty, and property; when it specifies (or fails to specify) the 
privileges and immunities to which citizens are entitled; and when it 
safeguards the equal protection of the laws. And these are the very clauses on 
which Barnett wishes to hang a great deal of his constitutional theory.  
If, as seems more likely, we understand Barnett to be saying that the 
purpose of writtenness is to constrain government actors in the sense of 
limiting their power (that is, checking and restraining state actors),73 then 
Barnett seems to smuggle into his premises the libertarian conclusion he 
wishes to establish. From the point of view of a political theory that rejects 
libertarian conclusions and recognizes fundamental and affirmative material 
entitlements against the community, the goal of a constitution, even of the 
writtenness of a constitution, would not be simply to constrain state actors. 
Consider, for example, a conception of justice, like the progressive version of 
natural law theory introduced above, that understands the individual as 
affirmatively entitled to a basic education and level of material well-being, 
whatever his luck or the life choices or material circumstances of his parents. 
On such a view, a state that could only protect the prerogatives of private 
ownership but that was not empowered, or perhaps obligated, to tax its 
citizens in order to fund a redistributive system of public education (or private 
educational vouchers) would fall short of the demands of justice and would 
therefore, on Barnett’s view of legitimacy, be invalid. By characterizing the 
purpose of the Constitution’s writtenness as primarily about the constraint (by 
which he seems to mean limitation) of government power rather than about its 
compulsion, Barnett appears simply to be helping himself to the libertarian 
view of government as, above all, a threat to be restrained.74 
 
with id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”). In this respect, the U.S. Constitution seems typical of written 
constitutions, which often contain a mixture of vague principles and specific directives. 
Compare ALA. CONST. § 15 (“[E]xcessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual 
punishment inflicted.”), with id. amend. 480 (“Effective the beginning of the next term of 
office after ratification of this amendment, the judge of probate of Greene county shall be 
compensated on a salary basis.”). For a discussion of discretion-inviting constitutional 
provisions in the South African context, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE 
OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 149-63 
(2006). 
73.  BARNETT, supra note 6, at 105. 
74.  Barnett also fails to take notice of the special circumstances posed for a natural rights 
libertarian theory by large corporations. These massive and powerful entities, themselves 
artificial creations of the state, possess none of the natural traits that would entitle them to 
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Sotirios Barber has correctly noted that one need not even reject a 
fundamentally libertarian conception of the state to understand that the 
purpose of a constitution must be both to constrain and to empower.75 After 
all, government will not act as an effective nightwatchman if it does not have 
the power and obligation to tax and spend. As Alexander Hamilton put it, 
“[T]he vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty . . . [and] a 
dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the 
rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the 
firmness and efficiency of government.”76 Acknowledging as much, Barnett 
notes that his conception of liberty will sometimes require government to take 
affirmative steps to satisfy its rights-protecting obligations.77 But this 
admission does not keep him from often writing as if the “security of liberty” 
has an asymmetric relationship with government empowerment and 
constraint, to the disadvantage of the former.78  
In light of the state’s affirmative role in protecting even narrowly negative 
conceptions of liberty, however, it is far from self-evident that the 
Constitution’s writtenness uniquely serves the purpose of constraining 
government power such that it does not also serve the purpose of empowering 
(or obligating) government to act to protect citizens’ rights. One move in 
Barnett’s direction would be to assert, as Barnett does, that state actors are in 
 
the same regard as actual persons within a natural law political theory, even a libertarian 
one. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR 
BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 18-21 (1986). To be sure, there are reasons to protect the rights of 
large corporations, most having to do with instrumental goals of wealth creation or the 
indirect protection of the natural rights of their members or owners. But those rights will be 
of a different sort than the natural rights grounded in human nature that are of concern to 
Barnett, and there is no reason to assume that their content will be precisely the same. See id. 
at 88-96. Barnett largely ignores these complications and appears to endorse simply 
extending to corporations the same “natural” liberty rights enjoyed by real human beings. 
See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 6, at 265 (discussing the liberty interests of companies that 
wish to carry first-class mail). There is nothing inevitable about that treatment, as Gregory 
Alexander makes clear in his discussion of German constitutional law. See ALEXANDER, supra 
note 72, at 103. A recognition of the dubious natural grounds for corporate rights would 
open up a far broader role for state regulation to protect the autonomy interests of actual 
persons against corporate giants. 
75.  See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION 44-53 (2003) (arguing that the 
pursuit and protection of so-called negative liberties demand government power). 
76.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
77.  See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 84. 
78.  See id. at 103 (“The Constitution is a law designed to restrict the lawmakers.”); id. at 104 
(“Unless rulers are constrained by law, they are dangerous to the not-at-all-fictional rights 
of the people.”); id. at 104-05 (“How can . . . governors [be] checked and restrained if the 
written words mean only what legislatures or judges want them to mean today?”). 
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fact inexorably prone to overstep their bounds in a way that renders 
writtenness’s constraining function more fundamental than its empowering 
function.79  
The “Ambitious Official,” a well known trope, has been around since the 
beginning of American constitutional discourse.80 And the Constitution’s 
writtenness may well help to keep his ambitions in check, although, as I discuss 
below, perhaps not as much as Barnett seems to think. But another, less 
prominent trope demonstrates why, at least as a conceptual matter, writtenness 
can be just as crucial to the empowerment of government actors as to their 
limitation. I am thinking here of the “Lazy Bureaucrat.” The Lazy Bureaucrat is 
as incompetent and shiftless as his overbearing cousin is savvy and ambitious. 
In response to a citizen’s entreaty, the Lazy Bureaucrat is prone to wearily wave 
off the request by disclaiming the authority or obligation to act. For the Lazy 
Bureaucrat, government office is about short hours, steady paychecks, the 
accoutrements of power, and perhaps the occasional kickback. 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA)—under the direction of Michael Brown, who 
may forever be identified as the paradigmatic Lazy Bureaucrat—explained the 
federal government’s slow response to the disaster by saying that it did not 
have the authority to provide assistance until specifically invited to do so by 
state officials.81 FEMA was very likely understating its authority, thereby 
attempting to minimize its responsibility to act in the early hours of the crisis.82 
Efforts by the Lazy Bureaucrats of the world to shirk their duties serve as 
important counterpoints to the assumption that government actors will 
relentlessly and ambitiously push toward the outer limits of their power. 
Just as a written constitution can be said to serve the purpose of clarifying 
the limits on the Ambitious Official’s powers, so too it provides needed 
ammunition for those attempting to convince the Lazy Bureaucrat that he has 
the discretion—or even the obligation—to act. In other words, the writtenness 
of a constitution can, as a conceptual matter, serve multiple functions at once: 
it can clarify the limits it imposes on government actors, and it can make plain 
 
79.  See id. at 104. 
80.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing the system of checks and 
balances and explaining how setting bureaucratic ambitions against each other can protect 
against government abuse of power).  
81.  See World News Tonight: Who’s To Blame for Delayed Response to Katrina? (ABC television 
broadcast Sept. 6, 2005), available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/print?id=1102467. 
82.  See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAW & NAT’L SEC. ET AL., HURRICANE KATRINA TASK FORCE 
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 4-5 (2006), http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/publications/ 
hurricane_katrina_report_2006_2.pdf. 
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the powers and duties it grants to them. It may well be that, as classical liberals 
suppose, the task of constraining the Ambitious Official is a more pressing (or 
more frequent) problem than motivating the Lazy Bureaucrat,83 but the truth 
of this empirical assertion cannot be deduced (as Barnett attempts to do) from 
the mere fact that the Constitution is a written document.  
Moreover, it is not even clear that a belief in the greater threat posed by the 
Ambitious Official would mean that written constitutions must be understood 
to constrain the power of the actors toward whom they are directed. Another 
strategy, one apparently favored by the Framers, would be to empower 
competing bodies of government in the hope that they would limit each 
other.84 Confronted with an expansionist executive branch, a weak and 
quiescent legislative or judicial branch arguably only further endangers liberty. 
Indeed, Barnett’s solution to the problem of the “lost Constitution,” in which 
he calls for a radical empowerment of one branch of the federal government—the 
federal judiciary—through his presumption of liberty, implicitly relies on a 
similar intuition.  
In the final analysis, Barnett’s argument that the Constitution’s writtenness 
uniquely serves the purpose of governmental constraint appears to be simply a 
restatement of his classical liberal commitments.85 Perhaps these commitments 
will turn out to be the correct ones, but Barnett must make that argument. 
C. Constraint and Lock-In 
Even assuming that the principal purpose of a written constitution is to 
constrain, it is far from self-evident that, as Barnett claims, the only adequate 
way to honor the significance of that purpose is through a commitment to the 
original meaning of constitutional texts. To understand Barnett’s argument for 
the exclusive suitability of original meaning, it is important to distinguish 
between two different, although related, concepts at play in Barnett’s 
argument: constraint and “lock-in.” Barnett argues that the purpose of the 
Constitution’s writtenness is to constrain government actors—that is, to limit 
the government’s present freedom of action or power. That constraint, 
however, is fairly meaningless, he suggests, if it is not accompanied by what he 
 
83.  As Barber argues, it is not clear that this was the view of the Framers. See BARBER, supra note 
75, at 39, 53.  
84.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 76, at 322 (“Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition.”).  
85.  It is therefore no accident that, as Calabresi has observed, Barnett affords dramatically 
divergent treatment to the power-conferring and power-limiting provisions of the 
Constitution’s text. See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 1083-88. 
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calls “lock-in”: the successful projection of that constraint into the future. 
Barnett’s concern for lock-in as an independent goal of constitutional 
writtenness can itself be understood as combining, on the one hand, concerns 
about predictability and stability in constitutional interpretation, and, on the 
other, a more substantive, justice-based demand for stability in the way a 
constitutional system actually operates. Barnett’s discussion does not always 
distinguish clearly among these various interests, but his objection to 
nonoriginalist hermeneutics of the constitutional text appears to be twofold: 
first, they do not adequately constrain constitutional interpretation, and 
second, they provide an inadequate guarantee that the constraints on 
government imposed today by the application of an interpretive method will 
not be modified (say, by judicial reinterpretation of the constitutional text) 
tomorrow. The latter failure is both unfaithful to the Constitution’s 
writtenness and, Barnett suggests, can be substantively unjust. 
1. Constraint 
To begin with, as many theorists have noted, it is important not to 
overstate how much actual constraint original-meaning textualism provides, 
particularly when we consider the difficulty of determining the proper level of 
generality at which to assess competing original meanings.86 Setting aside 
originalism’s practical difficulties, let us assume that Barnett is correct that the 
highest degree of interpretive constraint comes from adherence to a written 
text’s objective original meaning. Interpretive anarchy, however, is not the only 
alternative to such a commitment. Barnett treats the constraint he advocates as 
if it were an all-or-nothing affair,87 but the interpretive constraint of 
writtenness is a question of degrees.  
 
86.  See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 119-22; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 
Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 53 (2000) (“To 
interpret the document . . . is to engage in an act of construction . . . .”); Martin S. Flaherty, 
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1812-13 (1996) (describing various originalist 
approaches to constitutional interpretation that vary in the generality of the principles they 
attribute to the Constitution’s original meaning); Michael J. Gerhardt, The End of Theory, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 283, 325 (2001) (reviewing JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001)) (“The challenge of originalism entails 
eliminating subjective discretion in choosing the level of generality at which to state the 
appropriate level of original understanding.”); Morrison, supra note 60, at 854-55 
(discussing the problem of generality); Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312-13 (1996) (contrasting “soft” and “hard” originalism). 
87.  See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 106. 
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At least as a conceptual matter, between original-meaning textualism and 
utter disregard of a written text, there are a number of intermediate positions 
that, while perhaps less constraining than the most optimistic descriptions of 
original-meaning textualism, still take seriously the Constitution’s writtenness. 
Alternative hermeneutics, of either the soft originalist or nonoriginalist variety, 
might direct lawyers to look to the present consensus meaning of the text,88 the 
relevant paradigm cases implicated by a particular textual provision,89 the best 
“translation” of what they take to be the motivating general principle behind 
the text,90 or their understanding of the requirements of legal “integrity” as 
they operate on understandings of that particular text.91 A judge faithfully 
applying one of these interpretive methods might be able to make the 
Constitution mean many things, but she could not make it mean anything she 
wanted. Texts are not infinitely pliable, particularly when read according to an 
established interpretive practice.92 An overriding desire to honor the 
Constitution’s writtenness, understood as a constraint on interpretation, does 
not by itself necessitate an exclusive commitment to original-meaning 
textualism. 
At most, Barnett has established that his favored interpretive method is one 
possibility among many or, perhaps, that it provides the greatest interpretive 
constraint among the various contenders. What Barnett needs is some 
argument that lesser forms of constraint are somehow inadequate and that only 
the highest possible degree of constraint will do justice to the function of a 
document’s writtenness—but he provides us with none.  
2. Lock-In 
As with constraint, lock-in is a matter of degree. If a particular 
nonoriginalist reading of the constitutional text can provide enough 
interpretive constraint to do justice to the Constitution’s writtenness, an 
independent concern for stability, understood as future interpretive 
predictability, would not seem to change the equation. If an interpretive 
method provides sufficient constraint for interpreters today, at least as a matter 
of constitutional writtenness, it is not clear why the degree of future lock-in it 
 
88.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 510-11 (1996). 
89.  See RUBENFELD, supra note 86, at 178-95. 
90.  See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
91.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986). 
92.  Cf. Merrill, supra note 88, at 510 (“[I]f you assembled a diverse group of lawyers and asked 
them to give a legal opinion to a real client about the meaning of a written text, there 
typically would be substantial consensus about what the text means.”). 
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provides would be inadequate. Indeed, as Thomas Merrill has argued, a 
nonoriginalist interpretive method accompanied by a strong theory of stare 
decisis might well provide more interpretive predictability than an originalist 
method in which newly discovered or indeterminate historical evidence 
concerning original meaning creates the possibility of a constant reassessment 
of even longstanding constitutional readings.93 
Of course, under almost any political theory, the substantive question of 
justice is not wholly separate from inquiries about constitutional stability. 
Barnett is therefore certainly correct when he suggests that some degree of 
actual stability in the operation of constitutional structures is necessary for a 
constitutional system to be worthy of obedience.94 But he never specifies 
precisely how much stability justice requires, nor does he make the case that 
the requisite stability can only be provided by adherence to the original 
meaning of our written Constitution.  
The closest Barnett comes to an argument in this regard is his suggestion 
that a sufficiently stable system of liberty would be impossible to maintain in 
the absence of a written constitution and that, as a consequence, an unwritten 
constitutional system—or a written constitutional system not constrained by 
originalist interpretation—would be substantively unjust.95 Barnett would be 
hard-pressed, however, to demonstrate that a seemingly stable system that 
operates justly in all other respects is ultimately unjust and is therefore 
unworthy of obedience simply because it does not hew closely to the original 
meaning of a unitary constitutional document. But this is exactly what he 
needs to establish in order to sustain his argument that only original-meaning 
textualism is consistent with constitutional legitimacy (understood as 
substantive justice). Without such a premise, Barnett cannot, given his strictly 
justice-based theory of constitutional legitimacy, rule out the legitimacy of a 
nonoriginalist judicial reinterpretation of a constitutional text, as long as that 
reinterpretation coheres with the substantive demands of justice. Barnett’s 
answer is (as it must be) to deny that a constitution not reduced to writing 
could satisfy the requirements of justice. This assertion, however, depends 
upon extremely controversial empirical assumptions that go completely 
unsupported in his book.96  
 
93.  See id. at 516. 
94.  See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 109, 117 (noting an essential connection between 
constitutional legitimacy—that is, justice—and constitutional writtenness). 
95.  See id. 
96.  Larry Kramer’s description of the stability of the customary English Constitution seems to 
belie Barnett’s prediction of the uncertainty and oppression that would result from a failure 
to memorialize constitutional constraints in a written document. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
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Nor is it even clear that a written constitution interpreted according to its 
original meaning is sufficient to provide the actual stability that justice 
demands. For example, the original meaning of a written constitution might 
make the amendment process exceedingly easy.97 Even for a constitution with 
onerous amendment provisions, however, it is not the words themselves, or 
their original meaning, that ensures that today’s constraints on government 
action will survive tomorrow. It is only the words in conjunction with an 
institutionalized commitment to recognizing the authority of those words or 
that meaning.98 After all, there is no more assurance that the commitment to 
the original meaning of the writing will survive than there is a guarantee that 
an otherwise perfectly just, although unwritten, constitutional system will 
continue to operate justly in the future. Barnett’s story about a “lost 
Constitution” is precisely one in which he argues that a commitment to 
original meaning has been missing in this country for the greater part of a 
century. 
If it is the case that constitutional stability owes more to a (nontextual) 
commitment of government actors to be constrained by particular meanings 
than to the words of the Constitution itself, it would seem that as much (or as 
little) actual stabilizing work could be done even with a commitment to 
nonoriginalist readings of the constitutional text. We can imagine, for example, 
that there might be an entrenched customary commitment not to change the 
nonoriginalist principles on which the government operates absent some 
formalized, supermajoritarian—but perhaps unwritten—“amendment” process 
that gauges public sentiment to permit such a fundamental change. Bruce 
Ackerman’s dualist constitutional theory could be described as setting forth 
 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 12-15 (2004). The 
government system produced by this unwritten constitution does not seem to have been so 
unstable as to become, for that reason alone, unjust. Even if Kramer has painted an overly 
rosy view of the English Constitution’s clarity and stability, see, e.g., J.W. GOUGH, 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 2 (1955); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE 
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT 
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 49 (reissue 1987) (1957), we can fairly easily imagine a 
society that operates along the lines Kramer describes. Barnett must do more to convince 
readers that not only a written constitution but, indeed, one interpreted according to its 
original meaning, is necessary to achieve the degree of stability actually required by natural 
justice. 
97.  The current Alabama Constitution (the state’s sixth), for example, allows amendment by 
legislative proposal, a process that requires a three-fifths vote in both houses of the Alabama 
legislature. ALA. CONST. § 284. Amendments so proposed are then submitted for approval 
by a majority of voters. Id. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in light of the ease with which it can be 
altered, the Alabama Constitution has been amended nearly 800 times since its adoption in 
1901. 
98.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56-57 (2d ed. 1994). 
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such a “cultural” model of constitutional stability.99 Would such a 
constitutional culture necessarily yield substantively inadequate lock-in, 
understood as actual stability? Barnett rejects Ackerman’s theory as providing 
inadequate stability compared to textual originalism,100 but he does not set 
forth any good reasons for doing so. Although Ackerman’s theory provides a 
slightly easier method of constitutional amendment, both theories would 
appear to provide stability to a degree that is at least sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of justice. Their most salient difference seems to be the precise 
legal content they identify for perpetuation. 
In summary, the Constitution’s writtenness, even if understood as 
performing a constraining or stabilizing function, does not, by itself, compel us 
to accept original-meaning textualism as the only possible interpretive method. 
Barnett cannot rule out alternative hermeneutics without making substantive 
arguments in favor of the libertarian commitments plainly underlying his 
interpretive preferences. 
D. The Nature of Natural Rights 
Even if one were convinced by Barnett’s argument that original-meaning 
textualism is the only way to lock in a just constitutional scheme, Barnett’s 
plausible reading of the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause and the Ninth Amendment as incorporating elements of natural law 
into the constitutional scheme is not properly limited to the libertarian 
conception of the content of natural law at the expense of more progressive 
versions of natural law theory. Barnett’s natural rights theory and its 
progressive natural law rival agree in their views of human rights and 
obligations, whatever their content, as in some sense objectively grounded.101 
As Barnett says, in language that many adherents to a progressive natural law 
methodology could easily accept, “[T]he existence of individual rights is an 
appropriate conclusion from the nature of human beings and the world in 
which we live.”102 
Given such a conception of the status of human rights, it is possible, in fact 
practically necessary, to take Barnett’s originalist reading of the Ninth 
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause as gesturing toward 
 
99.  See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991). 
100.  See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 108-09. 
101.  See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 118 (2d ed. 1998). 
102.  BARNETT, supra note 6, at 44. 
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objective moral categories—rights and obligations grounded in human 
nature—that serve as constraints on (or imperatives for) government action. 
Even if the Framers happened to understand the precise content of those 
natural rights in specifically libertarian terms, Barnett does not offer a reason 
why we must understand the referent of the constitutional provisions on which 
he focuses to be Locke’s conception of the content of those rights and not the 
actual natural rights themselves, whatever they might be.103 Indeed, Barnett’s 
claim of a consensus at the time of the Framing regarding the content of 
natural rights may actually undermine the result he seeks, because it renders 
fundamentally ambiguous any reference to natural rights in the Framers’ 
reflections on the Constitution’s meaning. Without any controversy over the 
issue, there was no need for the Framers to clarify whether they understood the 
Constitution to reflect the rights actually retained by the people or only the 
Lockean understanding of those rights. 
Originalist considerations would also seem to favor an interpretation not 
limited by libertarian presuppositions. The Ninth Amendment refers to the 
“rights . . . retained by the people.”104 It is far more straightforward to 
understand this language as referring to the “rights . . . [actually] retained by 
the people,” whatever those might be, than to treat the text as somehow self-
referentially limiting its significance to the Framers’ specific understanding of 
the content of those rights. The Framers were not proto-pragmatists or 
postmodernists, in the mold of a Richard Rorty or a Stanley Fish, intent only 
on articulating and preserving what they understood to be a particular (and 
parochial) tradition of Western liberal discourse. As Barnett notes, the Framers 
(and indeed, most everyone in their generation) really believed in something 
called “natural rights” and thought it impossible to reduce the rights with 
which they were concerned to some finite list that could, as such, be 
incorporated by reference into the constitutional scheme.105 Indeed, he argues, 
it was just this impossibility that led the Framers to include the Ninth 
Amendment in the Bill of Rights in the first place.106 
In other words, a natural law view that identifies the referents of the Ninth 
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause as those rights grounded 
in human nature, and not one contingent (and contested) theory of those 
rights, could, without changing any other aspect of Barnett’s theory, open the 
door to the constitutional assertion of a progressive natural law theory. As our 
 
103.  See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 555, 563-68 (2006). 
104.  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
105.  See BARNETT, supra note 6, at 54-60. 
106.  See id. at 59-60. 
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best working theories about human flourishing and, consequently, about the 
content of human rights developed, so too would the precise content of the 
rights understood to be incorporated by reference into the constitutional text. 
Moreover, even assuming broad agreement on a stable conception of human 
flourishing, changing material conditions in society might yield new theories 
about how to translate that conception into a system of rights recognized by 
the state. Embracing this more flexible, and more plausible, understanding of 
the nature of the rights protected by the Constitution would free constitutional 
exegetes to bring into their analysis the insights of progressive theories of 
natural justice—theories that would incorporate the sorts of affirmative 
obligations and entitlements that Barnett’s libertarian theory very much tries to 
rule out. 
Once we start down this path, Barnett’s most startling doctrinal 
innovation, the “presumption of liberty,” becomes unnecessary and, indeed, 
indefensible. When the only rights that matter are rights to be free from 
government interference, Barnett is arguably correct that all government 
restraints on liberty labor under a cloud of illegitimacy. But when, for example, 
satisfying the economic rights or entitlements of some entail the state’s 
restraint on the property rights of others, the grounds for suspicion of 
government action across the board, particularly in the economic realm, are 
substantially mitigated. If, for example, justice guarantees workers’ rights to 
safe working conditions, a living wage, and collective bargaining, the state 
cannot act to safeguard that right without at the same time restricting 
employers’ contract and property rights. Economic regulation on this view 
becomes no different from government regulation of conflicting property 
rights through nuisance law—a function that libertarians are happy to ascribe 
to the state. When the field of permissible (or obligatory) state action becomes 
sufficiently broad, a device like Barnett’s presumption of liberty would tip the 
balance too far in favor of a narrow subset of rights at the expense of other 
government obligations of equal or greater importance. Rejecting Barnett’s 
narrow conception of rights therefore compels a rejection of his dramatic 
expansion of judicial authority to second-guess legislative action. 
iii. reviving a progressive naturalism? 
Barnett deserves a great deal of credit for helping to raise interest in the 
potential (even the progressive potential) of natural law constitutional theory, 
although I fear that Barnett’s book will reinforce the reflexive tendency to 
associate natural law reasoning with the political right. Despite the current 
domination of natural law theory by political conservatives, however, natural 
law arguments have provided the raw materials for some of the most 
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progressive moments in modern American history. As Barnett and others have 
observed, the Founding generation was deeply motivated by democratic 
commitments drawn from natural law political theory.107 Similarly, 
abolitionists drew heavily upon natural law to formulate their jurisprudential 
arguments and to justify their civil disobedience against fugitive slave laws.108 
More recently, in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
turned to the classical natural law tradition to justify his civil disobedience 
against, among other things, segregationist practices in Birmingham’s private 
businesses.109 And, as Michael Perry has observed, natural law theory provides 
a powerful foundation for the pervasive modern discourse of universal human 
rights. In Perry’s words, natural law is the very “position presupposed by the 
idea of human rights.”110 In light of this long tradition of natural law 
progressivism, and despite a renewal of interest in natural law among moral 
philosophers and conservative legal thinkers, it is perplexing that the tradition 
has been largely disregarded by contemporary progressive legal scholars and 
political theorists. 
Some people will no doubt worry that the danger that natural law 
methodology will engender an untethered judicial activism makes even a 
progressive natural law constitutionalism unattractive. To favor a natural law 
constitutional theory, however, does not require that one join in Barnett’s call 
for a dramatic expansion of judicial power. As I have discussed above, natural 
law theory is consistent with a number of rules of recognition and 
constitutional hermeneutics. Indeed, there is no inconsistency in 
 
107.  See id. at 53-86; ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 9-10 (1975); RUBENFELD, supra note 
86, at 67-68. 
108.  See COVER, supra note 107, at 34-35. 
109.  See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (1963), in FREEDOM ON MY MIND: 
THE COLUMBIA DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 347 
(Manning Marable ed., 2003). In the letter, King relied on the Thomistic natural law 
tradition to justify his movement of nonviolent resistance: 
One may well ask: “How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying 
others?” The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and 
unjust. . . . One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. 
Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree 
with St. Augustine that “an unjust law is no law at all.” 
   Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine 
whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares with 
the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony 
with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law 
is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law . . . .  
Id. at 352. 
110.  MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 68 (1998). 
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simultaneously affirming both a natural law political theory and an overriding 
commitment to judicial restraint.111 An image of how such a combination might 
operate in practice emerges from Robert Cover’s description of antebellum 
slavery jurisprudence: 
In the judge’s eclectic groping for canons of construction and principles 
of exegesis in his work with statutes, in his search for a common law 
process, both adequately flexible and sufficiently certain; in his struggle 
to adjust conflicting rules and principles of diverse sovereign entities, 
he often spoke of the preference for liberty or the natural right of 
freedom or the undesirability of slavery. His warrant for making and 
applying these judgments was taken to be an “abstract” principle of 
natural law. I must stress, however, that almost all of these interesting 
and often important applications of natural law and preferences for 
liberty were subject to the usual hierarchy of sources for law: 
constitutions, statutes, and well-settled precedent.112 
One might have wished for a bit more judicial activism regarding slavery’s 
constitutional status, but Cover’s discussion makes clear that there is no 
intrinsic connection between the natural law’s potent language for talking 
about the moral quality of the law and unrestrained judicial power. In other 
words, an affirmation of natural law theory is every bit as consistent with the 
judicial minimalism advocated by Larry Kramer as it is with the judicial 
supremacy favored by Barnett. Following the lead of Lawrence Sager, a 
progressive natural lawyer might affirm a broad set of constitutional 
entitlements without committing to their full judicial enforcement.113 Failure 
by the state to honor those entitlements might sound instead in legal 
obligation, justifying acts of protest and civil disobedience, and perhaps even 
self-help appropriation, without demanding judicial micromanagement of the 
political branches.114 
Finally, on a more pragmatic level, at a time when many observers view the 
political left as alienated from religious voices and badly in need of a moral 
language in which to frame its goals,115 natural law discourse provides the 
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114.  See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 46 (manuscript at 82-91, on file with author). 
115.  See Nunberg, supra note 4. 
PENALVER_12-08-06_POST-OP 12/8/2006  7:12:18 PM 
the yale law journal 116:101   2007  
134 
 
possibility of translation. There is no intrinsic connection between natural law, 
as a philosophical system, and any particular religious faith. On the other hand, 
there is a longstanding practice of reliance on natural law argumentation 
within various religious traditions concerning issues of social and legal 
significance. Indeed, religious adherents often shift to the language of natural 
law when they want to speak to an audience outside their particular faith 
tradition.116 Natural law’s ability to speak simultaneously to both secular and 
religious audiences points to its unique potential to serve as a unifying 
discourse for progressives of various spiritual stripes. 
conclusion 
There is much to admire in Barnett’s interesting and innovative 
contribution to constitutional theory. Nevertheless, his attempt to impose on 
federal and state government the straitjacket of Lockean liberalism without 
actually defending Lockean political theory is ultimately unconvincing. It’s a 
good thing too: Lockean natural rights theory is built on a singularly 
implausible conception of the person. Luckily, we are not compelled, either by 
our existing Constitution or by the “lost Constitution,” to rely on it. Despite 
this, and indeed because of it, Barnett’s book—as well as his difficulty in 
containing natural law within the confines of libertarian political theory—is a 
welcome reminder of the many potential advantages to be gained from further 
developing a progressive natural law constitutional theory. 
 
 
116.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Pope, Natural Law in Catholic Social Teachings, in MODERN CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATIONS 41, 64 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 
2005). 
